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I. INTRODUCTION

For people like John Meada, III, the protections provided by the
Fourth Amendment' can be surprisingly narrow. However, for those who
study Fourth Amendment law, the fact that an individual can have no privacy interest in a closed container in their possession is no surprise at all.
Mr. Meada pled guilty to weapons possession charges after a warrantless
search of his home turned up firearms located in a closed container. The
search 3 of Mr. Meada's home was possible because the language of the
Fourth Amendment only prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures." 4
The definition of what is reasonable is what allows police officers to legally
enter a home, without a warrant, and search the contents of closed contain1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
2.
United States v. Meada, 408 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 2004).
3. The police officer's entry into Mr. Meada's residence was made pursuant to Mr.
Meada's roommate's request to obtain clothing located therein. Id.Prior to the entry, the
roommate obtained a restraining order against Mr. Meada. Id.
4.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).

[Vol. 30

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

ers located inside. At the heart of the definition of what is reasonable is the
requirement that police officers obtain a warrant before searching or seizing
an individual's property.5 In Maryland v. Buie, the United States Supreme
Court stated that "in determining reasonableness, we have balanced the
intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Under this test, a search of [a
home] or office is generally not reasonable without a warrant issued on
probable cause. 6
Like any good rule of law, however, the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement is subject to a bounty of exceptions. 7 Two exceptions in particular made the warrantless search of Mr. Meada's home reasonable. First,
the police had Mr. Meada's roommate's consent to enter and search the
home.8 Second, because the firearms that led to Mr. Meada's conviction
were in a container that clearly revealed its contents, the firearms were in
plain view and therefore subject to a valid warrantless search. 9 The plain
view doctrine allows police officers to seize contraband when its incriminating character is immediately apparent and when they come across it
while in a location where they have the right to be. 10 The search conducted
in Meada was not justified by the plain view doctrine alone; to justify this
search, the court had to call upon an extension to the plain view doctrinethe single-purpose container exception.11 This exception holds that some
containers so clearly reveal
their contents that the contents can be consid12
ered to be in plain view.
An individual's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is eroded by layer after layer of exceptions, but each of these exceptions is grounded in one principle: the reasonable expectation of privacy.13
5.
6.
7.

United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578, 582 (5th Cir. 2004).
494 U.S. 325, 331 (1990) (citation omitted).
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 735-36 (1983). See generally

ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

RONALD JAY

462-550 (2d ed. 2005);

WAYNE

R.

LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (4th ed. 2004).
8. Meada, 408 F.3d at 20 ("[P]olice need not seek a warrant where 'voluntary
consent has been obtained, either from the individual whose property is searched, or from a
third party who possesses common authority over the premises."' (quoting Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990))).
9.
Id. at 22.
10.
Brown, 460 U.S. at 736-37; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-68
(1971); see also Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 137 (1990) (finding that evidence need
not be discovered inadvertently as was required under Coolidge).
11.
Meada, 408 F.3d at 23.
12.
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764-65 n.13 (1979), overruled on other
grounds by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
13.
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Stephen P. Jones, Reasonable
Expectations of Privacy: Searches, Seizures, and the Concept of Fourth Amendment Standing, 27 U. MEM. L. REv. 907, 908 (1997) ("If a defendant does not have a reasonable expec-
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This reasonable expectation of privacy concept can act as the North Star
when navigating the often troublesome waters that are Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. The bottom line is that individuals lack Fourth Amendment
protection when they lack a reasonable expectation of privacy. 14 The exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement work by identifying
situations where individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their property or actions. 15 The reasonable expectation of privacy is
a key to understanding the single-purpose container exception which will be
the focus of this Comment.
In United States v. Tejada, Judge Posner identified a split in the way
the federal circuits apply the single-purpose container exception.16 The exception was recognized by the Supreme Court, 17 so there is no question as
to the validity of the exception (although this will not prevent a discussion
as to the exception's proper place in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
Rather, the circuits are divided on the issue as to the use of extrinsic evidence in determining which containers are or are not single-purpose containers. 18 The following materials will examine this split and its impact on
the application of the Fourth Amendment. To do this properly however,
there must be a thorough discussion of the reasonable expectation of privacy, the plain view doctrine, and the single-purpose container exception.
Specifically, Part 11 (A) will cover the reasonable expectation of privacy,
while parts 11 (B) and (C) will discuss the plain view doctrine and the single-purpose container exception, respectively. Next, in Part III, this Comment will begin to analyze the single-purpose container exception and reach
the conclusion that the exception should be eliminated, or at least limited
significantly, because its inconsistent use by the federal circuits leads to an
arbitrary application of Fourth Amendment protections to closed containers.
Part III (A) identifies the circuit split that developed based on the inconsistation of privacy in an area searched or an item seized, he does not suffer a Fourth Amendment violation.").
14. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (describing a two-part test
to determine when an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy and, thus, deserves
freedom from an unreasonable search or seizure).
15. See Sanders, 442 U.S. at 764-65 n.13 (explaining how some containers can be
searched without a warrant because they do not support a reasonable expectation of privacy).
16.

17.
18.

524 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 2008).

Sanders, 442 U.S. at 764-65 n.13.

Compare United States v. Gust, 405 F.3d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[C]ourts

should make judgments about the applicability of the 'single-purpose container' exception
by evaluating the nature of containers from the objective viewpoint of a layperson, rather
than from the subjective viewpoint of a trained law enforcement officer, and without sole
reliance on the specific circumstances in which the containers were discovered."), with
United States v. Williams, 41 F.3d 192, 197-98 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding a cellophanewrapped package to be a single-purpose container because of the circumstances in which it
was discovered and the police officer's experience).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITYLA WREVIEW

[Vol. 30

tent use of extrinsic evidence to determine which containers qualify as single-purpose containers. Finally, Parts III (B) and (C) work together to show
how allowing extrinsic evidence in the process of classifying containers as
single-purpose containers erodes the Fourth Amendment and leads to its
inconsistent application to closed containers.

II. BACKGROUND
A.

THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY

In deciding whether or not an individual's Fourth Amendment protections are violated when their conversations in a public telephone booth are
monitored by law enforcement agents, the Supreme Court created what has
come to be known as the reasonable expectation of privacy test. 19 Interestingly, the reasonable expectation of privacy test, which is now synonymous
with Katz v. United States, is not a product of Justice Stewart's majority
opinion,2 0 nor has it persisted without criticism. 21 The criticism seems to be
grounded in Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz where, while trying to
make sense of the majority opinion, he formulated a two-prong test to determine when an individual deserves constitutional protection via the
Fourth Amendment.22 It is really Justice Harlan's test that the Supreme
Court and Fourth
Amendment scholars now call the reasonable expectation
23
of privacy test.
In Katz v. UnitedStates, the Supreme Court changed the way it previously viewed the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment.24 The
19.
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (discussing the reasonable expectation
of privacy test developed in Katz); see also Jones, supra note 13, at 915.
20.
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 347-59; 1 LAFAVE, supra note 7, § 2.1(c), at 436 ("In his
oft-quoted concurring opinion in Katz, Justice Harlan stated the rule in terms of a 'two fold
requirement."').
21.
See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 7, § 2.1(c), at 436-39 (discussing how the first prong
of Justice Harlan's test has little significance in determining when an individual has an interest worthy of Fourth Amendment protection); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 382-85 (1974); Note, From Private Places to
PersonalPrivacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amendment Protection,43 N.Y.U L. REV.
968, 976 (1968) (stating that the test announced in Katz does little to guide future interpretation of the Fourth Amendment's scope).
22.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
23.
See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (attributing the twoprong test to Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz).
24.
Compare Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464-66 (1928) (limiting the
Fourth Amendment to only protect individuals from physical intrusions into their persons,
homes, papers, or effects), with Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53 (departing from Olmstead's narrow
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment by holding that protections granted by the Amendment extend beyond the search or seizure of tangible items).

20091

THE SINGLE-PURPOSE CONTAINER EXCEPTION

Court moved from a very strict interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to a
more expansive view. 25 Before the Katz opinion, the Supreme Court applied
the reasonableness standard 26 only to searches and seizures of persons,
houses, papers, and effects, just as the Amendment says to do.27 This traditional way of applying the protections granted by the Fourth Amendment
was illustrated in Olmstead v. United States. 28 In a very similar situation as
the one presented in Katz, the Court in Olmstead answered the question
"whether the use of evidence of private telephone conversations between
the defendants and others, intercepted by means of wire tapping, amounted
to a violation of the Fourth... Amendment" when done without a warrant,
in the negative. 29 The Court came to this result because, at the time, it was
unwilling to expand the Fourth Amendment's protection beyond searches
and seizures of tangible property.3 ° In support of this position, the court
cited several earlier opinions that limited the Fourth Amendment's protection to such property. 3' Because the information used to convict the defendants in Olmstead was obtained by wiretapping and not by a physical intrusion into their persons, houses, papers, or effects, it did not violate their
Fourth Amendment privacy rights. 32 Had the same information been obtained by opening a sealed letter, the opposite result would have occurred.33
Simply put, the process of tapping the defendants' telephones did not result
in any intrusion into their homes or offices, nor did law enforcement agents
seize any of their belongings, so their Fourth Amendment rights could not
have been violated.34 In two separate cases,
Justice Bradley ... and Justice Clarke ... said that ... the
Fourth Amendment [is] to be liberally construed to effect
the purpose of the framers of the Constitution in the interest
25.
See Jones, supra note 13, at 914 ("The Court... recognized that the proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment were no longer limited to tangible 'things' as believed in
Olmstead. Therefore, the police were no longer restricted only when they physically intruded
into one's property interest.").
26.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
27.
Id.; Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 455, 466; Jones, supra note 13, at 912.
28.
277 U.S. at 464.
29.
Id. at 455,466.
30.
Id. at 464 ("The amendment itself shows that the search is to be of material
things-the person, the house, his papers, or his effects.").
31.
See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Gouled v. United States, 255
U.S. 298 (1921); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
32.
Olmstead,277 U.S. at 469 (affirming the lower court, which upheld the defendant's convictions).
33.
Id. at 464.
34.
Id. ("The amendment does not forbid what was done here. There was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and
that only. There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants.").
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of liberty. But that cannot justify enlargement of the language employed beyond the possible practical meaning of
houses, persons, papers, and effects, or so to apply the
words search and seizure as to forbid hearing or sight.35
In Katz v. United States, the court did apply the words search and seizure as to forbid hearing or sight (at least in some situations).36 At the lower
court level, Mr. Katz's conviction for violating a federal statute prohibiting
the use of wire communication for the purpose of placing bets was upheld
because the evidence used to convict him was not obtained in violation of
the Fourth Amendment. 37 In their investigation, agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation placed a listening and recording device on a public
telephone booth that Mr. Katz was known to use. 38 Using the narrow interpretation of the Fourth Amendment discussed in Olmstead, this was the
correct result. 39 However, Mr. Katz claimed such surveillance, without a
warrant, violated his Fourth Amendment rights. 40 In support of this contention, Katz raised two issues:
A. Whether a public telephone booth is a constitutionally protected area so that evidence obtained by attaching
an electronic listening recording device to the top of such a
booth is obtained in violation of the right to privacy of the
user of the booth.
B. Whether physical penetration of a constitutionally
protected area is necessary before a search and seizure can
be said to be violative of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.41
In an act completely inconsistent with past precedent4 2 the Supreme Court
rejected this formulation of the issues because, as Justice Stewart wrote,

35.
Id. at 465.
36.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) ("Indeed, we have expressly
held that the Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but extends
as well to the recording of oral statements overheard without 'any technical trespass under
local property law."').
37. Id. at 348.
38. Id. at 348, 354.
39. Id. at 348-49 ("In affirming his conviction, the Court of Appeals rejected the
contention that the recordings had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment,
because 'there was no physical entrance into the area occupied by [Katz] .... .
40. Id.
41.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 349-50.
42.
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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"the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. ''43 The amendment
protects individuals from government intrusions, but the protections do not
stop there. 44 Because of the Court's new interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment, the parties' fixation in characterizing the telephone booth as a
constitutionally protected area was misplaced. 45 So too was the government's argument that the surveillance technique used was constitutional
simply because the phone booth was not penetrated.4 6 These arguments
were made obsolete by the Court's new interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment and the protection it provides individuals.4 7 In his majority
opinion, Justice Stewart said the Fourth Amendment goes beyond the tangible to include what the individual seeks to preserve as private. 48 "The
Court made it clear in Katz that the 'person' provided for in the text of the
Fourth Amendment extended beyond the physical body. The Fourth
Amendment 'person' included peoples' expectations that their activity will
remain private. ' 49 In the end, the Court held that the FBI violated the privacy Mr. Katz "justifiably relied [upon] while using the telephone booth,"
and because of this reliance, a search and seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment took place when Mr. Katz's conversation was monitored by the FBI.50
Using this language about justifiable reliance, Justice Harlan refined
the majority's new interpretation of the Fourth Amendment and created a
two-prong test to determine when an individual has an expectation of privacy that is worthy of Fourth Amendment protection.5' Justice Harlan
stated, "My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions
is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation
43.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
44. Id.at 350.
45.
Id. at 351 ("[T]he parties have attached great significance to the characterization
of the telephone booth from which the petitioner placed his calls. The petitioner has strenuously argued that the booth was a 'constitutionally protected area.' The Government has
maintained with equal vigor that it was not. But this effort to decide whether or not a given
,area,' viewed in the abstract, is 'constitutionally protected' deflects attention from the problem presented by this case." (footnote omitted)).
46.
Id.at 352.
47.
Id.at 353 ("[O]nce it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people-and not simply 'areas'-against unreasonable searches and seizures it becomes clear
that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical
intrusion into any given enclosure.").
48.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
49.
Jones, supra note 13, at 914.
50.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
51.
Id.at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Brian J. Serr, Great Expectations of
Privacy:A New Model for FourthAmendment Protection, 73 MiNN. L. REv. 583,592 (1989).
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be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' ' 52 While this
two part test, as a whole, is the current standard guiding Fourth Amendment
protection, the first prong is given little weight; in fact, "the courts frequently do not distinguish between the two parts of the Katz test."53 This is
likely because there are many situations in which a subjective expectation
can be overcome. For example, "the government [can] diminish each person's subjective expectation of privacy merely by announcing half-hourly
on television that ...we [are] all forthwith being placed under comprehensive electronic surveillance. 54 As a result, the subjective element of the test
is generally disfavored. 55 Justice Harlan even noticed the problems with the
subjective element and wrote in United States v. White that analysis under
Katz "must transcend the search for subjective expectations. 56
With or without the subjective element of Justice Harlan's test, an individual claiming a Fourth Amendment violation must still establish that
their expectation is "one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. 57 This is the element that really matters; it is the one courts most often look to in determining whether an individual suffered a Fourth Amendment violation.58 With respect to the subject matter of this Comment, the
constitutional use of the single-purpose container exception, hinges on what
society does or does not consider reasonable. 59 "The rationale for this doctrine rests on the notion that the Fourth Amendment does not protect expectations of privacy that society does not consider reasonable. 6 ° Therefore,
the warrantless search of the defendant's packages in United States v. Williams, which were "wrapped heavily in cellophane and a layer of brown
material," was constitutional because they were so likely to contain cocaine

52.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
53.
1 LAFAVE, supra note 7, § 2.1(c), at 438 (quoting Eric Bender, The Fourth
Amendment in the Age of Aerial Surveillance: Curtainsfor the Curtilage?, 60 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 725, 744-45 (1985)).
54.
Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 384; see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
741 n.5 (1979).
55.
Amsterdam, supranote 21, at 384 ("An actual, subjective expectation of privacy
obviously has no place in a statement of what Katz held or in a theory of what the [F]ourth
[A]mendment protects. It can neither add to, nor can its absence detract from, an individual's
claim to [F]ourth [A]mendment protection.").
56.
401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
57.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
58.
Jones, supra note 13, at 923.
59.
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764-65 n.13 (1979) ("Not all containers and
packages found by police during the course of a search will deserve the full protection of the
Fourth Amendment. Thus, some containers ...by their very nature cannot support any
reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward
appearance.").
60.
United States v. Williams, 41 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 1994).

2009]

THE SINGLE-PURPOSECONTAiNER EXCEPTION

that they could not support a reasonable expectation of privacy. 6I In contrast, because society recognized as reasonable a defendant's expectation of
privacy in his unmarked, hard-plastic case, the warrantless search by6 2federal
agents was deemed to be unconstitutional in United States v. Bonitz.
For better or worse, that is the reasonable expectation of privacy test.
Stated generally, "the formula is that 'wherever an individual may harbor a
reasonable expectation of privacy,'

. . .

he is entitled to be free from unrea-

sonable governmental intrusion. 63 The problem with this formula is that it
"offers neither a comprehensive test of [F]ourth [A]mendment coverage nor
64
any positive principles by which questions of coverage can be resolved."
Stated otherwise, while the Katz test invalidates the Supreme Court's prior
treatment of the Fourth Amendment's protections of privacy, the Katz test
does little to guide future interpretation of the scope of the amendment.65
The reasons for this are twofold. First, because the Katz test is based on a
reasonableness standard, it is inherently vague, and second, since Justice
Stewart failed to define the notion of "justifiable reliance," the opinion cannot effectively aid in determining what other circumstances, besides conversations in telephone booths, harbor a privacy interest that an individual
can justly rely upon.66 Despite this, courts have been willing to work with
the standard created in Katz; it is, after all,67the foundation upon which the
single-purpose container exception is built.

Finally, it is important to note that the Fourth Amendment only protects individuals from the unreasonable actions of government actors. 68
Therefore, if an employee for a shipping company inadvertently damages a
container so as to reveal its illegal contents, the owner of the container does
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy as to the action of that employee. 69 Additionally, the product of a private search can be turned over to
law enforcement officials and used as evidence to incriminate its owner.70
Only two types of conduct by government actors can violate Fourth
Amendment protection: searches and seizures.7 1 In the context of persons
61.

Id.
at 194, 197-98.

63.
64.
65.
66.

Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 383.
Id. at 385.
Note, supra note 21, at 976.
Id.

62.

67.

826 F.2d 954, 956 (10th Cir. 1987).

Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764-65 n. 13 (1979).

68.
Jones, supra note 13, at 917. The "Fourth Amendment does not prohibit search
or seizure conducted by private person[s] not acting as government agent[s] or in concert
with [a] government official." United States v. Donnes, 947 F.2d 1430, 1434 (10th Cir.
1991) (citing United States v. Smith, 810 F.2d 996, 997 (10th Cir. 1987)).
69. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115 (1984).
70. Id.
at 115-16.
71.

Jones, supra note 13, at 925.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNI!VERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 30

and property, a search occurs when a reasonable expectation of privacy is
infringed.7 2 Thus, federal agents conducted a search when they listened to
Mr. Katz's conversations in the telephone booth because Mr. Katz had an
73
expectation that his conversations in that booth would remain private.
Property is seized when "there is some meaningful interference with [the
owner's] possessory interests in that property. 74 Similarly, a seizure of a
person occurs when a government actor holds a person so that he or she is
not free to leave or carry about his or her business.7 5
B.

THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE

Since the single-purpose container exception is essentially an extension of the plain view doctrine, 76 a brief explanation of the plain view doctrine is warranted. The plain view exception to the warrant requirement
rests on the notion that "once police are lawfully in a position to observe an
item first-hand, its owner's privacy interest in that item is lost. ' 77 Once that
interest is lost, a warrantless seizure of the property is permissible under the
Fourth Amendment.78 For the plain view doctrine to be effective, however,
two requirements must be satisfied. 79 First, the officer must view the item in
question from a vantage point where he or she has the right to be. 80 For
example, "police may perceive an object while executing a search warrant,
or they may come across an item while acting pursuant to some exception
to the warrant clause.' In either of these situations, the police would have
a lawful justification for being in the location that allowed them to view the
incriminating evidence. Second, the incriminating nature of the evidence
sought to be seized must be immediately apparent to the police officer.82
For instance, because the incriminating character of the defendant's stereo
equipment in Arizona v. Hicks was not apparent without an inspection of
the serial numbers located thereon, the seizure of the equipment could not
be justified by the plain view doctrine. 83 Before the Supreme Court's opin72.

Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113.

73.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967).
74. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113.
75.
Jones, supra note 13, at 926.
76.
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 427 (1981), overruled on othergrounds by
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
77.
Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983).
78. Id.
79.
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 135-37 (1990).
80. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 736-37 (1983).
81.
Id. at 739 n.4; see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468 (1971)
("[P]lain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence.").
82. Brown, 460 U.S. at 736-37.
83. 480 U.S. 321, 324-26 (1987).
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ion in Horton v. California,84 the plain view doctrine had a third requirement; that the evidence was discovered inadvertently. 85 This was to prevent
the plain view exception from becoming a pretext for otherwise unlawful
searches.86 The need for an inadvertent discovery of incriminating evidence
was rejected in Horton.87 In Horton, the Court explained the fact that "an
officer is interested in an item of evidence and fully expects to find it in the
course of a search should not invalidate its seizure if the search is confined
the terms of a warrant or a valid exception to the
in area and duration by
88
warrant requirement.,
By expanding upon the second element of the plain view doctrine, the
single-purpose container exception brings the plain view doctrine into the
realm of searches.89 While the plain view doctrine will "support the warrantless seizure of a container believed to contain contraband, any subsequent
search of its concealed contents must either be accompanied by a search
warrant or justified by one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement"
such as the single-purpose container exception.9" As discussed earlier in
Mr. Meada's case, the warrantless search of his gun case was justified by
the single-purpose container exception. 9' Because the gun case's outward
appearance so clearly revealed the incriminating character of its contents,
they were immediately apparent to the searching officer and therefore in
plain view.92 In such a case, the police are not really searching the container
because they already "know" what it contains. That is, it was so obvious
that Mr. Meada's case contained a gun it was as if the gun was lying exposed on the bedroom floor of his home.

84.
496 U.S. at 137 (finding the inadvertent discovery element of the plain view
doctrine to be unnecessary, as was previously required under Coolidge).
Brown, 460 U.S. at 737.
85.
The requirement that the discovery be inadvertent means that police officers
cannot intrude on the individual's privacy any more than is justified by their lawful presence
in the viewing area. Thus, when the officer in Arizona v. Hicks, moved stereo equipment to
view the serial numbers labeled thereon, he exceeded the scope of his entry into the defendant's home, a lawful search for a person, and the inadvertent discovery element of the plain
view doctrine. 480 U.S. 321, 324-26.
Brown, 460 U.S. at 737.
86.
Horton, 496 U.S. at 137-39.
87.
88.
Id. at 138.
89.
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764-65 n.13 (1979).
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984); United States v. Williams,
90.
41 F.3d 192, 197 (4th Cir. 1994); see United States v. Donnes, 947 F.2d 1430, 1436 (10th
Cir. 1991).
United States v. Meada, 408 F.3d 14, 23 (1st Cir. 2005).
91.
Id.
92.
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THE SINGLE-PURPOSE CONTAINER EXCEPTION

Footnote thirteen of Arkansas v. Sanders created what is now the single-purpose container exception.93 The footnote was written to clarify the
majority's holding that a warrant is required to search luggage found in a
legally stopped automobile. 94 The footnote's purpose was to add flexibility
to the rule and allow for some warrantless searches. It states:
Not all containers and packages found by police during the
course of a search will deserve the full protection of the
Fourth Amendment. Thus, some containers (for example a
kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot support a reasonable expectation of privacy because
their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance. Similarly, in some cases the contents of a package
will be open to "plain view," thereby obviating the need for
95
a warrant.

The Supreme Court expanded upon the single-purpose container exception in Robbins v. California.96 In this opinion, the Court recognized that
the exception is "little more than another variation of the 'plain view' exception., 97 The Robbins Court went on to say that a container is protected
by the Fourth Amendment so long as its configuration does not reveal its
contents, thereby not effectively placing them in the plain view of police
officers. 98 In defining when a container so reveals its contents, a plurality of
the Supreme Court concluded that considering the circumstances in which a
container is found or the searching officer's "generalized factual assertions"
as to what a container likely contains would expand the exception beyond
what was intended by the Court. 99 General social norms define which ex-

93. 442 U.S. at 764-65 n.13; see also United States v. Gust, 405 F.3d 797, 799 (9th
Cir. 2005) (applying the single-purpose container exception). Some circuits, however, call
the exception by different names. See, e.g., Williams, 41 F.3d at 198 (applying the plain view
container doctrine); Donnes, 947 F.2d at 1437 (naming the exception the plain view container exception).
94.
Gust, 405 F.3d at 800.
95.
Sanders, 442 U.S. at 764-65 n.13.
96.
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 427 (1981).
97.
Gust, 405 F.3d at 800 (quoting Robbins, 453 U.S. at 427).
98.
Robbins, 453 U.S. at 427. This reasoning is consistent with the principle that,
absent some exception (e.g., the single-purpose container exception), "all containers will
receive the full protection of the fourth amendment during a police search" so long as their
owner has a reasonable expectation of privacy in their contents. United States v. Donnes,
947 F.2d 1430, 1435 (10th Cir. 1991).
99.
Robbins, 453 U.S. at 428.
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pectations of privacy are reasonable.' 00 Thus, as long as a container, by its
configuration, does not reveal its contents to a layperson, police officers
need to obtain a warrant before opening it.
The general rule articulated in Sanders was subsequently overruled by
California v. Acevedo which held that "police may conduct a warrantless
search of a container found in an automobile when they have probable
cause to believe contraband is contained in the automobile, regardless of
whether the probable cause extended specifically to the particular container." 101 Footnote thirteen is still relevant, however, because Acevedo applies only to automobile searches; it has no effect on searches conducted
elsewhere. 10 2 Robbins was also quickly overruled by United States v.
Ross. 10 3 Once again, this had no effect on footnote thirteen and the singlepurpose container exception because Ross overruled Robbins on grounds
limited to the context of automobile searches. 1°4 In fact, courts clearly recognize the continued105applicability despite the subsequent treatment of
Sanders and Robbins.
V. ANALYSIS

The single-purpose container exception can be justified on similar
grounds as the exceptions that came before it, 106 but any benefits to law
enforcement created by the exception are far outweighed by its shortcomId.
100.
Donnes, 947 F.2d at 1435 n.7.
101.
102.
United States v. Huffhines, 967 F.2d 314, 319 n.5 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that
the overruling does not alter the principles of footnote thirteen); see also Donnes, 947 F.2d
at 1435 n.7.
See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982); see also United States v.
103.
Gust, 405 F.3d 797, 801 n.8 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Ross overruled the 'precise holding' of Robbins that 'the police may not conduct a warrantless search of a closed, opaque container
found in a car even if they discover the container during a lawful search of the car'.
United States v. Miller, 769 F.2d 554, 559 n.4 (9th Cir. 1985).
Miller, 769 F.2d at 559 n.4.
104.
United States v. Meada, 408 F.3d 14, 23 (1st Cir. 2005) (recognizing the contin105.
ued validity of the single-purpose container exception); Gust, 405 F.3d at 801 n.8 (stating
that this court can still properly rely on the Robbins interpretation of the single-purpose
container exception); United States v. Villarreal, 963 F.2d 770, 776 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting
that the logic of footnote thirteen survives, despite Sanders and Robbins being overruled);
Donnes, 947 F.2d at 1435 (recognizing that Acevedo does not alter the principles of footnote
thirteen).
106.
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759 (1979). The exceptions to the warrant
requirement were "established where it was concluded that the public interest required some
flexibility in the application of the general rule that a valid warrant is a prerequisite for a
search." Id. For example, an exception to the warrant requirement is justified "where the
societal costs of obtaining a warrant, such as danger to law officers or the risk of loss or
destruction of evidence, outweigh the reasons for prior recourse to a neutral magistrate." Id.
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ings. By allowing the warrantless search of a container whose contents are
known with certainty by the police, the single-purpose container exception
eases some of the burdens created by the warrant requirement. 0 7 In allowing this exception, however, the Supreme Court unleashed upon an already
cluttered and confusing area of law,' °8 another rule that must be interpreted
and applied by courts throughout the country. This is where the singlepurpose container exception fails. Not only has the exception been applied
inconsistently by the circuits,' 0 9 it tends to apply to a very narrow set of
facts" 0 and further erodes the protections guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment."' The solution is to eliminate, or at least limit, the exception
and require law enforcement officers to get a search warrant.
A.

THE CIRCUIT SPLIT

Writing for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v.
Tejada, Judge Posner identified a split in the way federal circuits apply the
single-purpose container exception." 12 This case involved the warrantless
search of a bag, later found to contain cocaine, located in the defendant's
entertainment center. 3 Although this particular warrantless search was
validated by the inevitable discovery doctrine," 4 Judge Posner recognized
that had this not been the case, the single-purpose container exception
107. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 816 n.21 (1982) (noting the lengthy
time required to get a warrant and the strain it places on the public's resources).
108. See ALLEN ET AL., supranote 7, at 462-550.
109.
Compare United States v. Banks, 514 F.3d 769, 775 (8th Cir. 2008) (considering common practices in the handgun industry when finding a particular gun case to be a
single-purpose container), and United States v. Williams, 41 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 1994)
(finding that a cellophane-wrapped package to be a single-purpose container because of the
circumstances in which it was discovered and the police officer's experience), with Gust,
405 F.3d at 801 (disallowing extrinsic evidence and officer expertise in the determination as
to which containers qualify as single-purpose containers).
110. This case law suggests that the single-purpose container exception is used most
often to search packages of drugs and gun cases. See Gust, 405 F.3d at 798; Meada, 408
F.3d at 22; Williams, 41 F.3d at 194; United States v. Corral, 970 F.2d 719, 722 (10th Cir.
1992).
111.
See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764-65 n.13 (1979) (explaining
that a warrant is not required to search certain containers when their appearance 'reveals'
their contents); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (stating that, generally,
searches conducted without a warrant are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
112. 524 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 2008).
113.
Id. at 811.
114. See generally 6 LAFAVE, supra note 7, § 11.4(a), at 258-85 (noting that the
inevitable discovery doctrine allows for evidence found as a result of a Fourth Amendment
violation to be admissible in court, because its lawful discovery was inevitable despite the
Fourth Amendment violation); Robert M. Bloom, Inevitable Discovery: An Exception Beyond the Fruits, 20 Am. J.CRiM. L. 79 (1992).
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would have been addressed by the court.' 15 Whether or not it would have
been applied to justify the warrantless search is another matter not relevant
here. However, when the single-purpose container exception is relevant, the
circuits are divided as to when a container so clearly reveals its contents as
to justify a warrantless search." 16
The circuits do not disagree as to the constitutionality of the exception,
but rather in determining when to classify a given container as a singlepurpose container. 1 7 For example, the Fourth Circuit allows extrinsic evidence and the special expertise of police officers to be considered in determining when a container is a single-purpose container," 8 while the First,
Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits ignore this evidence in making the same
determination. 19 If the single-purpose container exception is never invalidated by the Supreme Court, the approach to the exception taken by these
latter circuits is the lesser of two evils and therefore should be adopted by
the remaining circuits. To be discussed in depth later, the approach taken by
the First, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits is preferable because it limits the
scope of the exception by allowing fewer containers to qualify and also
limits the amount of deference afforded to police officers. 20 The Seventh
Circuit has dealt with the issue, but has not officially taken a stance as to
what type of evidence should be allowed in determining whether or not a
container is a single-purpose container. 12' Like the Seventh Circuit, the
Eighth Circuit addressed the single-purpose container exception without
determining what type of evidence is appropriate in defining a single-

Tejada, 524 F.3d at 813.
115.
See id.
116.
Compare United States v. Williams, 41 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding a
117.
cellophane-wrapped package to be a single-purpose container because of the circumstances
in which it was discovered and the police officer's experience), with United States v. Gust,
405 F.3d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 2005) (disallowing extrinsic evidence and officer expertise in the
determination as to which containers qualify as single-purpose containers).
118.
Williams, 41 F.3d at 198.
See, e.g., Gust, 405 F.3d 797; United States v. Meada, 408 F.3d 14 (1st Cir.
119.
2005); United States v. Villarreal, 963 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Bonitz, 826
F.2d 954 (10th Cir. 1987).
Meada, 408 F.3d at 18-19 (declining to apply the exception to a container sim120.
ply because a police officer recognized it to be an ammunition can); Gust, 405 F.3d at 801
("[T]he extent to which a container's exterior reveals its contents should not be solely determined either by the circumstances of its discovery, or by the experience and expertise of
law enforcement officers." (quoting United States v. Miller 769 F.2d 554, 560 (9th Cir.
1985))).
121.
See, e.g., United States v. Cardona-Rivera, 904 F.2d 1149 (7th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Eschweiler, 745 F.2d 435 (7th Cir. 1984).
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purpose container. 22 Unlike the 1Seventh
Circuit, however, the Eighth Cir23
cuit clearly did not take a stance.
In United States v. Williams, the court determined that two packages
"wrapped heavily in cellophane and a layer of brown material"' 124 were single-purpose containers that did not support a reasonable expectation of privacy. 25 The searching officer's testimony that "in his experience, similarly
wrapped packages always contained narcotics' ' 126 weighed heavily on the
2
court. 127 So too did the circumstances in which the packages were found. 1
In the Fourth Circuit, when "determining whether the contents of a container are a foregone conclusion, the circumstances under which an officer
finds the container may add to the apparent nature of its contents."' 129 Here,
the packages were found in a suitcase along with dirty blankets, towels, and
a burned shirt. 130 Because these are not normal items to take on a crosscountry trip, the court found these circumstances relevant in establishing
3
the incriminating nature of each container's contents.' '
The majority of the circuits lie on the other side of the issue. 32 As
demonstrated in Gust, the Ninth Circuit "made clear that courts should assess the nature of a container primarily 'with reference to general social
norms' rather than 'solely... by the experience and expertise of law enforcement officers.' 33 The First Circuit used the same reasoning in United

122. See United States v. Banks, 514 F.3d 769, 773-75 (8th Cir. 2008).
123. See id. at 775 (explaining that the court does not need to determine whether it
may "consider testimony based on the special expert testimony of a police officer" in finding
a container to be a single-purpose container).
124. 41 F.3d 192, 194 (4th Cir. 1994).

125.
Id. at 197, 198.
126.
Id. at 194.
127.
Id. at 198. ("Given the fact that Detective Finkel is a ten-year veteran of narcotics enforcement, [his opinion] is a compelling factor pointing toward the conclusion that the
contents of the packages were a foregone conclusion.").
128.
Id.
129.
Williams, 41 F.3d at 197; see also United States v. Blair, 665 F.2d 500, 507 (4th
Cir. 1981) (allowing the warrantless search of containers simply because they were found
near similar containers that exposed their illegal contents).
130.
Williams, 41 F.3d at 194.
131.
Id. at 198.
132.
See, e.g., United States v. Gust, 405 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Meada, 408 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Villarreal, 963 F.2d 770 (5th Cir.
1992); United States v. Bonitz, 826 F.2d 954 (10th Cir. 1987).
133.
Gust, 405 F.3d at 803 (quoting United States v. Miller 769 F.2d 554, 560 (9th
Cir. 1985)); see also Bonitz, 826 F.2d at 956 (stating that a "hard plastic case did not reveal
its contents to the trial court even though it could perhaps have been identified as a gun case
by a firearms expert"). But see United States v. Huffhines, 967 F.2d 314, 319 (9th Cir. 1992)
(noting that the defendant had no reasonable expectation in a bag because the officer could
tell it contained a gun simply by looking at it).
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States v. Meada, when it validated the warrantless search of a gun case and
invalidated the search of a metal container thought to contain ammunition. 134 The court upheld the warrantless search of the gun case because its
label clearly revealed its contents such that expertise in firearms was not
needed to know the case contained a gun. 135 The opposite is true for the
ammunition can. 136 Although the police officer recognized the container as
one commonly used to contain ammunition, the court concluded nonetheless "that Meada did have a privacy expectation in the ammunition can because its outward appearance did not reveal [its contents]" to the average
person. 137
In further contrast to Williams and the Fourth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit
in Miller expressly stated that extrinsic evidence should not be considered
138
in deciding whether or not a container is a single-purpose container.
Miller dealt with the warrantless search of a plastic bag that contained an
"innocuous" white powder that had, mixed within it, another fiberglass container that contained cocaine. 39 The court found the bag did not, by its
outward appearance, announce its illegal contents to the casual observer. 140
In reaching this conclusion, the court stated, "The bag did not have a distinctive shape or odor that identified its contents, other than the white powder that proved to be innocuous.,' 4' Likewise, in denying to apply the sinIn Gust, the court cleared up any inconsistencies between Miller and Huffines
when it stated, "[a]lthough our discussion of the 'single-purpose container' exception in
Huffines was terse, we do not have to interpret it in a vacuum when other precedents like
Robbins and Miller speak to the same issue." Gust, 405 F.3d at 803. In Miller, the Ninth
Circuit made clear that courts should not rely on the "experience and expertise of law enforcement officers" when determining whether the single-purpose container exception is
applicable in a given case. Id.(quoting Miller, 769 F.2d at 560).
134.
408 F.3d at 24. In fact, the container was concealing two grenades. Id.at 18.
135.
Id.at 22 (noting that "GUN GUARD" was printed on the label).
UnitedStates v. Gust also involved the warrantless search of a gun case. See 405
F.3d at 798. The search was invalidated, however, because its "BUSHMASTER" label was
too ambiguous for the general public to discern it as a gun case. Id. at 804.
136.
Meada, 408 F.3d at 19.
137.
Id.
138.
United States v. Miller, 769 F.2d 554, 560 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Law enforcement
officers should not be permitted under the single-purpose container rule set out in Sanders
footnote 13 to conduct warrantless searches of containers that, though unrevealing in appearance, are discovered under circumstances supporting a strong showing of probable
cause.").
139.
Id.
140.
Id.
141.
Id.; see also United States v. Villarreal, 963 F.2d 770, 776 (5th Cir. 1992) (disregarding the label on a container that revealed some information about its contents); United
States v. Donnes, 947 F.2d 1430, 1437-38 (10th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that a police officer
could not infer that a camera lens case was associated with something illegal because it was
found in close proximity to a syringe).
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gle-purpose container exception to a camera lens case containing methamphetamine, the Tenth Circuit disregarded the fact that it was found inside a
glove with a syringe. 142 In Donnes, the court refused to consider extrinsic
evidence because had they not, the single-purpose container exception
would have been expanded to a point where a "warrantless search of any
container found in the vicinity of a suspicious item" would be valid. 43 In
concluding that the defendant's gun case in Gust was not a single-purpose
container, the court disregarded the circumstances surrounding the search as
well. 144 One of those circumstances was the defendant telling the police that
"the cases he and his companions were carrying contained guns."' 145 This
demonstrates the great length this court went to avoid considering extrinsic
evidence in identifying a container as a single-purpose container.
The Seventh Circuit may have abstained from taking a side on the issue at hand, 46 but when Judge Posner's opinion in United States v. Cardona-Rivera is scrutinized, it hints at the circuit's willingness to consider
47
extrinsic evidence when applying the single-purpose container exception.
The first example of this occurs when Judge Posner states several Supreme
Court Justices "believe ... that if the shape or other characteristics of [a]
container, taken with the circumstances in which it is seized' 4 .., proclaim
its contents unambiguously, there is no need to obtain a warrant."' 149 By
choosing these words in his opinion, instead of the opposing language used
in Miller, Judge Posner makes it appear that the Seventh Circuit would al-

Although the Donnes court recognized the officer's experience and training, the
court further explained that the inferences made by the officer were not without limitation:
We recognize that the officer's experience and training could have led
him to infer that the camera lens case contained narcotics in light of the
fact that it was found inside the glove with a syringe. However, this inference does not alter the "cardinal principle that 'searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable .... '
Id. at 1438 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978)); see also United States v.
Bonitz, 826 F.2d 954, 956 (10th Cir. 1987) ("This hard plastic case did not reveal its contents to the trial court even though it could perhaps have been identified as a gun case by a
firearms expert.").
142.
Donnes, 947 F.2d at 1438.
143.
Id.
144.
United States v. Gust, 405 F.3d 797, 804 (9th Cir. 2005).
145.
Id. at 798.
146.
Whether the contents of a container "could be thought in 'plain view' because
[they were] known with certainty, is an issue that has divided the circuits"; however, this
issue is one in "which our court has not taken a position." United States v. Tejada, 524 F.3d
809, 813 (7th Cir. 2008).
147.
See 904 F.2d 1149 (7th Cir. 1990).
148.
For example, taking the container from a suspected drug dealer as opposed to a
"harmless old lady." Id. at 1155.
149.
Id.
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low extrinsic evidence when determining which containers qualify as single-purpose containers. Even more revealing, is Judge Posner's willingness
to consider extrinsic evidence in Cardona-Rivera.'50 There, the defendant
lost any expectation of privacy he had in his container when he told police
that it contained "coke." 15 ' The opposite happened when the defendant in
Gust told the police that his containers contained guns. 152 Finally, Judge
Posner's note that the defendant was found with a cellular telephone was
extrinsic evidence when
unnecessary unless the circuit does in fact consider
1 53
applying the single-purpose container exception.
When the Eighth Circuit addressed the single-purpose container exception it did so with restraint. 15 4 Here, the goal was to limit the exception
to prevent it from completely eroding the expectation of privacy individuals
have in everyday containers such as guitar cases or jewelry boxes. 55 In
applying the rule to the facts in Banks, the court clearly did not determine
whether or not a court may consider the "special expertise of a police officer" in classifying a container as a single-purpose container. 156 This is because the "Phoenix Arms" label on the defendant's container made clear,
even to the average person, that it contained a gun. 157 This was enough to
strip the defendant of his expectation of privacy in the case and validate the
officer's warrantless search of its contents.' 5 8
The Supreme Court made statements that favor the First, Fifth, Ninth,
and Tenth Circuits' treatment of the single-purpose container exception in
its plurality opinion in Robbins v. California.'59 In this case, "the Court
150.
Id. at 1155-56.
151.
Compare Cardona-Rivera,904 F.2d at 1156 (stating that once the defendant
"admitted that his package contained a contraband substance, no lawful interest of his could
be invaded by the officers' opening the packages"), with United States v. Gust, 405 F.3d
797, 801-03 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that a defendant retained a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his container, despite admitting its contents to police officers).
Gust, 405 F.3d at 798.
152.
Cardona-Rivera,904 F.2d at 1155. ("[The defendant] does not question the
153.
existence of probable cause to arrest him and seize his briefcase with the packages of cocaine (and-the mark of an up-to-date drug dealer or stockbroker-the cellular telephone that
was also in the brief case).").
United States v. Banks, 514 F.3d 769, 774 (8th Cir. 2008) ("[Tlhe single154.
purpose nature of a container reduces the degree of privacy that a reasonable person may
expect, but does not eliminate it."). Given this restraint, it would not be incorrect to assume
this circuit may favor the First, Ninth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits' treatment of the singlepurpose container exception.
Id. ("[W]e do not wish our statement of the single-purpose container rule to be
155.
read such that we authorize police to open any seemingly innocuous single-purpose container.").
156.
Id. at 775.
Id.
157.
158.
Id.
453 U.S. 420 (1981).
159.
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rejected the argument that packages wrapped in green opaque plastic...
were plain view containers because an experienced observer could have
inferred that the packages contained marijuana."'' 60 Because the police officer's testimony did not establish that marijuana was "ordinarily 'packaged
this way,"' the defendant continued to have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his packages wrapped in green plastic as the average person
would not have recognized them to contain contraband.' 6' Further, while
interpreting Robbins, the Miller Court found that a single-purpose container
should not be defined solely by the circumstances of its discovery. 62 As a
general matter, the circuit split turns on the interpretation of Robbins. Circuits that choose to follow the plurality's opinion "evaluate the nature of a
container without regard for the context in which it is found or the fact that
the searching officer had special reasons to believe the container held contraband,"'163 and those who do not, allow extrinsic evidence and specialized
knowledge to be considered in classifying containers.
B.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ALLOWING EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE AND POLICE
EXPERTISE

By considering extrinsic evidence and the special expertise of police
officers in classifying a container as a single-purpose container, courts exacerbate two problems. First, by considering these types of evidence, more
containers will qualify as single-purpose containers, 164 thus creating more
situations where warrants will not be required. 165 Second, when courts defer
to police judgment as to which containers are single-purpose containers,
there is a greater opportunity for mistake or misconduct, which the warrant
process is designed to prevent.' 66 When considering the use of special p0160. United States v. Donnes, 947 F.2d 1430, 1438 (10th Cir. 1991); see Robbins,
453 U.S. at 427-28.
161.
Robbins, 453 U.S. at 428.
162.
United States v. Miller, 769 F.2d 554, 560 (9th Cir. 1985).
163.
United States v. Gust, 405 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2005).
164. See Illinois v. Jones, 830 N.E.2d 541, 552 (Il. App. Ct. 2005) ("We agree with
the State that perhaps a reasonable civilian could fail to recognize a 'one-hitter' box as drug
paraphernalia."). This tends to show that, had the court relied solely on the "general social
norms" standard discussed in Miller, the container in question would not have been classified as a single-purpose container. Id.; see also United States v. Williams, 41 F.3d 192 (4th
Cir. 1994) (relying heavily on the circumstances in which a container was found in making
the determination to classify it as a single-purpose container).
165.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) ("[S]earches conducted outside
the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions.").
166.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 450 (1971) ("[P]rosecutors and
policemen.., cannot be asked to maintain the requisite neutrality with regard to their own
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lice knowledge, the Miller Court recognized that to permit such an extension of the single-purpose container exception "would increase significantly
the risk of erroneous police decisions167 on whether there is sufficient certainty to permit a warrantless search."'
1.

The WarrantRequirement

Central to the Fourth Amendment is the idea that a search or seizure
will be unconstitutional if not accompanied by a warrant. 168 The warrant
requirement holds a prominent place in United States Supreme Court decisions and for good reason. 169 Language suggesting it should only be bypassed in a few situations needs to be respected.1 70 As more exceptions to
the warrant requirement are accepted by the Supreme Court, the chances
that unconstitutional deprivations of privacy will take place greatly increase. 71 The continued existence of the single-purpose container exception, especially in its broadest form, 72 and other erosions of the Fourth
Amendment like it, cannot be overlooked as insignificant. 173 The Supreme
Court recognized in Boyd v. United States' 74 and again in Coolidge that
"illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in ... si75
lent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure."',
Arguably, the single-purpose container exception is the kind of silent approach or slight deviation the Court contemplated in Boyd. It was certainly
investigations-the 'competitive enterprise' that must rightly engage their single-minded
attention."); see also Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1947).
167. Miller, 769 F.2d at 560 (quoting 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 7.2(e), at 245 (Supp. 1985)).
168.
See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467 (noting that intrusions, by way of search or seizure, are evils that should not be justified without a careful determination as to their necessity); Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
169.
The warrant requirement stands for the "basic constitutional doctrine that individual freedoms will best be preserved through a separation of powers and division of functions among the different branches and levels of government." Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 753, 759 (1979) (quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 317
(1972)).
170.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
171.
United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972).
172.
See United States v. Williams, 41 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 1994) (considering extrinsic evidence and special police knowledge in applying the single-purpose container exception).
173.
Sanders, 442 U.S. at 759-60 ("[Elach exception to the warrant requirement
invariably impinges to some extent on the protective purpose of the Fourth Amendment...
.11).

174.
175.
at 616).

116 U.S. 616 (1886).
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,454 (1971) (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S.
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a concern of the Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. 76 The Court went on to
suggest that adherence to the warrant requirement is the remedy to such an
77
undesirable consequence, the continuance of an unconstitutional practice.
The argument against strict adherence to the warrant requirement has
merit because an after-the-fact review of police decisions can be more efficient, as it generates less litigation and uses fewer resources. 178 There is
also evidence to suggest that magistrates do not always demonstrate the
neutrality envisioned by the Supreme Court. 179 However, when police officers go their entire career without knowing what a search warrant is, the
movement has gone too far. In Donnes for instance, the warrantless entry of
the defendant's home was made by a police officer who, after being an officer for eighteen years, "had never once obtained a search warrant, and...
'didn't even know what a search warrant was."' 180 Warrants are also necesaid in successful searches and seisary to prevent unlawful intrusions and
181
zures as part of police investigations.
2.

PoliceDeference

When federal circuits defer to police officer judgment in deciding
whether or not to classify a container as a single-purpose container, they
create executive power that is counter to the Fourth Amendment and susceptible to misuse. 82 The Fourth Amendment "interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the police" as a means to have an "objective mind
weigh the need to invade [an expectation of privacy]."' 8 3 Supreme Court
precedent suggests that this is because:

176. See United States v. Banks, 514 F.3d 769, 774 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Gust, 405 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Villarreal, 963 F.2d 770, 776 (5th
Cir. 1992).
177.
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 454.
178.
See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 433 (1981) (discussing the effect the
warrant requirement has on the public's limited resources); 2 LAFAVE, supra note 7, § 4. 1(a),
at 442-45.
179.
2 LAFAVE, supra note 7, § 4.1 (a), at 442-45.
180. United States v. Donnes, 947 F.2d 1430, 1434 n.2 (10th Cir. 1991).
181.
2 LAFAVE, supra note 7, § 4.1(a), at 442-45. When police obtain a warrant before making a seizure or conducting a search, they know for a fact that their actions are
lawful and the evidence they seize will be admissible in court. Id. at 444. With after-the-fact
review, a search can be deemed unconstitutional, where had the police been aware of a deficiency, for example, through the warrant process, they could have investigated further to
correct it and then effect a valid search. Id.
See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 449-55; see also United States v. U.S. Dist. Court
182.
(Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972).
183.
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948); see also Coolidge, 403
U.S. at 449 ("When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a
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The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not
grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in
requiring those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime. 184
A neutral and detached magistrate is an important element in a system
where the mistakes of well-intentioned, but overzealous, police officers can
create serious constitutional violations when their interests in solving a
crime cause them to put the constitutional interests of their suspect into the
background.185 For example, had the police officer in Gust obtained a
search warrant before opening the defendant's gun case, the defendant's
Fourth Amendment rights would have been protected and his conviction on
weapons charges would likely have been sustained. 186 In McDonald v.
United States, the Supreme Court suggested that the right of privacy is "too
precious to entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of
crime and the arrest of criminals.' 8 7 However, to say that police officers
cannot be trusted is to go too far.' 88 Therefore, police discretion in the context of the single-purpose container exception should be limited, not eliminated. The purpose of limiting police discretion in this context is to retain
the reasonable expectation of privacy rightfully attached to most containers
and to prevent unconstitutional intrusions into peoples' privacy. As stated
in Gust, when courts consider the special knowledge of police officers
when classifying containers, the result is an overly intrusive single-purpose
container exception that "essentially permits law enforcement to conduct
warrantless searches of indistinct and innocuous containers ...

in contra-

vention of the well established principle that 'no amount of probable cause
can justify a warrantless search or seizure absent exigent circumstances."",189 To this end, the Supreme Court has made an effort to ensure
rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or Government enforcement
agent.").
184.
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 449 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 1314 (1948)).
185.
See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759 (1979).
186.
United States v. Gust, 405 F.3d 797, 803-04 (9th Cir. 2005).
187. 335 U.S. at 455-56.
188. Id.
189.
Gust, 405 F.3d at 802 (quoting Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 137 (1990));
see also United States v. Banks, 514 F.3d 769, 774 (8th Cir. 2008) ("If we allow police to
open any single-purpose container they lawfully come across we would be authorizing exploratory searches of containers where a reasonable person would rightfully expect privacy:
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that expectations of privacy are not invaded by unfettered police discretion. 90
Although the single-purpose container exception has not been extended to violin cases or cereal boxes as posited in Banks, fears of the expansive effect of considering special police knowledge in the context of the
single-purpose container exception are justified.' 91 As noted in Appendix B
of Gust, the defendant's gun case was very similar to the average guitar
case and the government attempted, nonetheless, to justify the warrantless
92
search of that container using the single-purpose container exception.'
Also, the hard plastic case under review in Bonitz, was so93nondescript that
the trial court would have suspected it to contain a violin.'
Police discretion is essential, and is often considered in the context of
police officers' decisions to arrest or not to arrest, due to the reality that not
every criminal ordinance or statute can or should be enforced at all times.' 94
However, with discretion comes the potential for abuse and misuse which
can negatively impact the police function and individual citizens. 195 The
issues and concerns presented by police discretion in the context of arrest
are transferrable to the present issue of warrantless searches of containers
and are therefore worth discussing here.' 96 Despite its place in law enforcement, there is reason to eliminate unnecessary discretion and to control
that discretion which is necessary. 97 The primary reason is to place a check
on police power, because out of all the trustworthy police officers, there is a
handful that will abuse their power and potentially deprive citizens of their
rights. 98 For example, as mentioned in Banks and Gust, an officer could
use the discretion granted to him as a tool for validating the warrantless
for example, police could open violin cases and guitar bags, look inside cereal boxes and
bread baskets, or empty out clothes hampers and jewelry boxes without even a suspicion that
these containers hold evidence of a crime.").
190.
See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47
(1979).

191.
192.
193.

Banks, 514 F.3d at 774.
Gust, 405 F.3d at 807-14.
United States v. Bonitz, 826 F.2d 954, 956 (10th Cir. 1987).

194.
See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 62-63 (1975) ("No matter what
the legislative body has made a crime and no matter what the literal words of the full enforcement legislation say, patrolmen do not arrest for all offences committed in their presence.").
195.
See GREGORY HOWARD WILLIAMS, THE LAW AND POLITICS OF POLICE
DISCRETION 90 (1984).
196.
United States v. Miller, 769 F.2d 554, 560 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that too much
police deference can lead to erroneous decisions); see also United States v. Villarreal, 963
F.2d 770, 775 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying a narrow construction of the single-purpose container exception to avoid the problems associated with classifying containers).
197.
See DAVIS, supra note 194, at 141-43.
198.
Id.at 143.

2009]

THE SINGLE-PURPOSE CONTAINER EXCEPTION

searches of countless containers that ordinarily would support a reasonable
expectation of privacy.
When circuits consider evidence derived from the searching officer's
expert knowledge, they introduce a subjective element 99 into the determination of what privacy interest is reasonable that is not present in the Robbins interpretation of the single-purpose container exception.200 This subjective element further exacerbates the problem of the circuit split by creating
a situation where the reasonableness of an individual's expectation of privacy will turn on the knowledge of the particular officer searching his or
her belongings. Because all police officers do not possess the same knowledge, the very same container could exclaim its contents to officer A, but
not officer B. Thus, in the context of the single-purpose container exception, the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment are determined not
by the United States Constitution or its courts, but by the mere chance a
police officer may recognize a container as containing something criminal.
To avoid these problems, the single-purpose container exception, if it
is going to be used at all, should be limited in its scope. That is, it should be
applied without considering special police knowledge or the circumstances
in which the container was found as suggested in Robbins.2 °1 In most cases,
however, the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement should be adhered
to because after all, "[i]t is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights
of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments
' 20 2
thereon.
C.

INCONSISTENCY CREATED BY THE SINGLE-PURPOSE CONTAINER
EXCEPTION

The problem with this circuit split is that it produces inconsistent results that add confusion to the law, making it more difficult for police offi199. E.g., United States v. Meada, 408 F.3d 14, 24 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting that a tin
can was not a single-purpose container because the officer present at the time did not know
what it contained); United States v. Williams, 41 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 1994) (relying on
the searching officer's experience, not general police knowledge, in identifying a singlepurpose container).
200. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 428 (1981) ("Expectations of privacy are
established by general social norms...."); see also United States v. Gust, 405 F.3d 797, 801
(9th Cir. 2005) ("[Clourts should make judgments about the applicability of the 'singlepurpose container' exception by evaluating the nature of containers from the objective viewpoint of a layperson rather than from the subjective viewpoint of a trained law enforcement
officer.").
201.
See Robbins, 453 U.S. at 427-28; see also Gust, 405 F.3d 797; Meada, 408 F.3d
14; United States v. Villarreal, 963 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Bonitz, 826
F.2d 954 (10th Cir. 1987).
202. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454 (1971) (quoting Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)).
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cers, attorneys, and judges to do their jobs.2 °3 The Supreme Court has recognized the problems caused by inconsistencies in the law and has, in the
past, worked to resolve them.204 The same should be done with the singlepurpose container exception. Not only is the rule applied inconsistently as
to what evidence is allowed, there is inconsistency even among the circuits
that allow the same amount of evidence. 20 5 The negative result of the inconsistent application of the single-purpose container exception is that similar
containers are given different levels of Fourth Amendment protection.
Take for example, packages of drugs. In United States v. Williams,
which was decided in a circuit that allows extrinsic evidence, the court
found that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
bricks of cocaine. 0 6 On the other hand, in Robbins v. California,similarly
wrapped bricks of marijuana sustained a reasonable expectation of privacy.207 In its reasoning, the Robbins Court did not rely on the searching
officer's testimony that he knew the packages contained illegal drugs due to
his years of experience.20 8 Miller provides another troubling example of the
inconsistent application of the single-purpose container exception. 20 9 As
discussed above, Miller involved the illegal search of a fiberglass container
that was found in a plastic baggy filled with an innocuous white powder.2 10
There is little to differentiate this container from the one taken from the
defendant's suitcase in Williams; they both consist of white powder sur203.
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 768 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (explaining that confusions in the law create difficulties for police, prosecutors, and the courts).
204.
See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579 (1991) ("Although we have recognized firmly that the doctrine of stare decisis serves profoundly important purposes in our
legal system, this Court has overruled a prior case on the comparatively rare occasion when
it has bred confusion or been a derelict or led to anomalous results ....
[Tlhe existence of
the dual regimes for automobile searches that uncover containers has proved as confusing as
the Chadwick and Sanders dissenters predicted. We conclude that it is better to adopt one
clear-cut rule to govern automobile searches .... ").
205.
Compare United States v. Villarreal, 963 F.2d 770, 776 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating
that simply because a container's label "purports to reveal some information about its contents does not necessarily mean that its owner has no reasonable expectation that those contents will remain free from inspection by others"), with United States v. Meada, 408 F.3d 14,
22 (1st Cir. 2005) ("[The defendant] did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
contents of [his] gun case because the case's GUN GUARD label 'clearly revealed its contents. It was specifically made to carry guns and was stamped accordingly."'). While both of
these circuits apply a narrow version of the single-purpose container exception-one that
disregards extrinsic evidence and subjective viewpoints of police officers-they still lack
consistency when applying the exception, because they give different consideration to labels
on containers and, therefore, different constitutional protection.
206.
41 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 1994).
207.
453 U.S. 420, 428 (1981).
208. Id at 427-28.
209.
See United States v. Miller, 769 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1985).
210. Id. at 560.
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rounded by transparent plastic. 2 11 For two containers so similar in appearance and purpose, to be given inconsistent constitutional treatment should
not be tolerated. With such unpredictability, how is a police officer to know
when he may or may not assume a cellophane or plastic wrapped 'brick'
contains illegal drugs? As alluded to in the previous section, he may not
know, and therefore he may encroach upon a citizen's or suspect's Fourth
Amendment rights.
The First, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits' unwillingness to consider
specialized police knowledge when applying the single-purpose container
exception is favorable, because it narrows the number of situations where
the exception will be applicable.2 12 However, relying on general social
norms to determine whether a container is a single-purpose container is not
without flaws and can still produce inconsistent results. To validate the warrantless search of the defendant's gun case in Meada, the court relied on its
label for support that its contents were unambiguous. 13 Because the case
said "GUN GUARD" on it, a layperson could reasonably expect it to contain a gun.21 4 Using the same standard, general social norms may suggest
that the white powder in a plastic baggy is really cocaine, but as we have
already seen, the Miller court was unwilling to reach this conclusion.2 15 The
chances of the white powder in a plastic baggy being cocaine and a gun
being found in a case labeled "GUN GUARD" are too similar for these
containers to be given unequal constitutional protection.
The different treatment of labeled containers is yet another problem
with the single-purpose container exception. 216 Despite a Supreme Court
opinion 217 where the Court found that "descriptive labels on boxes of obscene films did not eliminate the reasonable expectation of privacy in the
content of the films,' 218 some federal circuits have found that labels on con211.
See Williams, 41 F.3d at 194; Miller, 769 F.2d at 555.
212. United States v. Gust, 405 F.3d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 2005) ("In Miller, we interpreted the Robbins plurality opinion to mean that courts should make judgments about the
applicability of the 'single-purpose container' exception by evaluating the nature of containers from the objective viewpoint of a layperson ....
").
213. United States v. Meada, 408 F.3d 14, 23 (1st Cir. 2005).
214. See id
215. Miller, 769 F.2d at 560.
216. Compare United States v. Banks, 514 F.3d 769, 775 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding
that the single-purpose container exception applied to a container labeled "Phoenix Arms"
because a casual observer could conclude that it contained a gun), with United States v.
Villarreal, 963 F.2d 770, 776 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that simply because a container's label
"purports to reveal some information about its contents does not necessarily mean that its
owner has no reasonable expectation that those contents will remain free from inspection by
others").
217.
Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980).
218.
United States v. Donnes, 947 F.2d 1430, 1438 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Walter,
447 U.S. at 658-58) (Marshall, J., concurring)).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 30

tainers that exclaim their contents remove any expectation of privacy in
those contents.21 9 In the Fifth Circuit, "[t]he fact that the exterior of a container purports to reveal some information about its contents does not necessarily mean that its owner has no reasonable expectation that those contents will remain free from inspection by others., 220 However, in applying
the very same single-purpose container exception, the Eighth Circuit came
to the opposite conclusion and determined that a container's label makes its
contents known to the layperson.221 So too did the First Circuit.22 Here, the
court considered the "GUN GUARD" label on the defendant's container as
evidence to suggest a layperson could expect the case to contain a firearm.2 23 As a result, two identical containers-gun cases with some label
describing their contents-will receive different treatment in terms of the
warrant requirement, despite being protected by the same Fourth Amendment. The single-purpose container exception in its current divided form is
creating situations where identical containers are not being given identical
constitutional protection. To resolve this problem, federal circuits need to
consistently disallow extrinsic evidence and apply the general social norms
standard explained in Robbins224 and followed by the First, Fifth, Ninth,
and Tenth Circuits when applying the single-purpose container exception.2 25 The better solution; however, may be to discontinue using the exception altogether.
The inconsistent application of the single-purpose container exception
by the federal circuits is further complicated by the state courts' reliance on
their opinions. Illinois courts have been struggling with the issue for decades.226 In Illinois v. Jones, the Illinois Supreme Court finally made a decision that the expert knowledge of police officers should be considered in
determining whether a container is for a single-purpose, and therefore does
not support an expectation of privacy.227 In doing so, the Court upheld the

219. E.g., Donnes, 947 F.2d at 1438.
220.
Villarreal, 963 F.2d at 776 ("If the government seeks to learn more than the
label reveals by opening the container, it generally must obtain a search warrant.").
221.
Banks, 514 F.3d at 775.
222.
See United States v. Meada, 408 F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 2005).
223.
Id.
224.
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 428 (1981) ("Expectations of privacy are
established by general social norms ....
").
225.
E.g., Meada, 408 F.3d at 24; Villarreal,963 F.2d at 776; Donnes, 947 F.2d at
1438; United States v. Miller, 769 F.2d 554, 560 (9th Cir. 1985).
226.
See Illinois v.Evans, 631 N.E.2d 872 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1994), overruled by Illinois
v. Jones, 830 N.E.2d 541 (111. 2005); Illinois v. Penny, 544 N.E.2d 1015 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989);
Illinois v. Smith, 431 N.E.2d 699 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) rev'd on other grounds, 447 N.E.2d
809 (i1. 1983).
227.
830 N.E.2d 541, 555 (111. 2005).
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warrantless search of a one-hitter box 228 that a police officer viewed in the
defendant's shirt pocket during a traffic stop. 229 Although the officer's testimony showed he was uncertain as to the container's actual contents, the
Court deferred to his judgment nonetheless.230 In support of this conclusion,
the Court cited the Fourth, Tenth, and Seventh Circuit cases of Williams,
Corral, and Eschweiler.231 The effect of Jones was to disregard prior Illinois precedent 2 32 and erode Fourth Amendment protections by allowing
more containers to qualify as single-purpose containers. 3 The consequences of this decision are great considering the facts of Illinois v.
Penny.234 In that case, the Court invalidated the warrantless search of "a
package, approximately 7 inches in diameter and 4 inches thick, wrapped in
a brown opaque plastic material ....
,,231 "Here, the only reasons given for
the search [were] based on the officer's experience[;] the officer thought
that the package 'looked like a kilo of cocaine' ....236 Should this situation present itself in Illinois today, the Illinois Supreme Court would likely
uphold the validity of the search by relying on police officer testimony despite the fact that "a thousand other items . . . are legitimately used and
packaged in similar wrappings. 2 37 This creates an undesirable situation in
which fewer containers are granted the Fourth Amendment protection they
deserve.

228. This wooden box was "approximately two inches wide, four inches tall, and less
than an inch thick." Id.at 546. Containers of this type are "commonly used to carry cannabis." Id
229. Id.
230. Id. at 556 ("Viewed from [the officer's] standpoint, taking into account his
training and experience, we conclude that defendant's 'one-hitter' box proclaimed its contents. To a civilian, it is possible that [the officer's] belief could seem to be a mere 'suspicion.' To [him] however, the contents of the box were a virtual certainty.").
231.
Id.at 554.
232. Jones overruled Evans, where the court determined that a one-hitter box, found
in the same manner as in Jones, did support an expectation of privacy despite the searching
officer's prior experience. Illinois v. Evans, 631 N.E.2d 872, 874-77 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994),
overruled by Illinois v. Jones, 830 N.E.2d 541 (Ill.
2005) (noting that the searching officer,
in fifty previous encounters with one-hitter boxes, did not find illicit items).
233. In the Jones opinion, the court stated, "[w]e agree with the State that perhaps a
reasonable civilian could fail to recognize a 'one-hitter' box as drug paraphernalia." Jones,
830 N.E.2d at 552. Had the Illinois Supreme Court relied on the First, Fifth, Ninth, or Tenth
Circuits and applied a "general social norms standard," the defendant would have retained a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his box, and the Fourth Amendment would have
avoided another attack on its integrity.
234. 544 N.E.2d 1015 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
235. Id.at 1016. ("When [the officer] poked a hole in the top of the package with a
knife, he saw that it contained white powder which later proved to be cocaine.").
236. Id.at 1017 (emphasis added).
237. Id.at 1016.
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This problem extends beyond Illinois. Unlike the federal courts in the
Ninth Circuit, the state courts of Washington expand upon the singlepurpose container exception by considering police officer experience.2 38 In
Washington v. Courcy the court considered the warrantless search of a
folded paper bindle. 239 Here, the court determined the warrantless search
was valid because the officer was able to make the "necessary factual assertions" that cocaine is ordinarily packaged this way and because he had the
"necessary identification experience. 24 ° In Colorado v. Mascarenas, the
court also determined that a paper bindle was a single-purpose container
and therefore validated a warrantless search of such a container. 241 The
treatment of paper bindles appears to be reasonable. In Michigan, however,
a very similar container received very different treatment, which again
brings into question the reasonableness of the single-purpose container exception. 242 In Michigan v. Bickel, the court invalidated the warrantless
search of small foil packets found in a plastic bag in the defendant's possession.243 Incredibly, in making its determination, the court ignored the observations of a layperson who believed the packets to contain contraband.2 "
So, this state court refused to apply even the more conservative version of
the single-purpose container exception that is used in the First, Fifth, Ninth,
and Tenth Circuits.245 The result is an inconsistency in the treatment of very
similar containers used for the same purpose. The only real difference between a paper bindle and a folded piece of foil is the material in which they
are made. Fourth Amendment protections should not be determined by such
a distinction. Because of the inconsistent application of the single-purpose
container exception, people cannot be sure if the containers they use to hold
their belongings support the reasonable expectation of privacy they deserve.
The solution is to discontinue, or at least significantly limit, the use of the
single-purpose container exception; a rule that appears logical on its face,
but is unworkable as applied.
238.
See Washington v. Courcy, 739 P.2d 98, 101-02 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
239.
Id.at 99. A bindle is essentially a makeshift envelope made from folded paper.
See id
240.
Id.at 102.
972 P.2d 717, 722 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998) ("[B]indles ...are the sort of unique,
241.
single-purpose containers that may be opened without a search warrant under the 'singlepurpose container rule."').
242.
Michigan v. Bickel, No. 201169, 1998 WL 1990380, *1 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
But see Florida v. Redding, 362 So. 2d 170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
243.
Bickel, 1998 WL 1990380, at * 1. Laboratory tests confirmed that the foil packets contained heroin. Id.
244.
Id.
245.
E.g., United States v. Gust, 405 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Meada, 408 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Villarreal, 963 F.2d 770 (5th Cir.
1992); United States v. Bonitz, 826 F.2d 954 (10th Cir. 1987).
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VI. CONCLUSION

The logic behind the single-purpose container exception is sound. It allows police officers to efficiently locate contraband and seize it. As the
cited cases have shown, the exception is an effective tool to help police get
drugs off the streets and guns away from dangerous people.246 In these cited
cases, there was not a single time where the officers' experience led them
astray. Each time, their intuitions were correct and the container in question
did contain contraband. Consider Crawford v. Florida as an example of
how perceptive police officers can be.247 In Crawford,the searching officer
felt in the defendant's pocket a small cylindrical tube, which the officer
believed to be an M&Ms candy container filled with crack cocaine.2 48 Once
the container was removed from the defendant's pocket, the officer's suspicions were verified.249
The single-purpose container exception is not undesirable because it
proves to be an effective tool for law enforcement officers in locating contraband and making arrests. The deference the single-purpose container
exception provides to police officers is arguably beneficial to society because it aids police in their mission to fight crime. It is important to remember, however, that the "evil of an unreasonable search or seizure is that it
invades privacy, not that it uncovers crime, which is no evil at all., 250 The
problem is that the single-purpose container exception is not evenly applied. Because the federal circuits do not agree as to the kinds of evidence
allowed in classifying single-purpose containers, and because labeled containers are not given consistent treatment, the Fourth Amendment is being
applied inconsistently to very similar containers. To apply the Fourth
Amendment in such a way is to do so arbitrarily, which undermines the
purpose of the amendment altogether. The significance of the Fourth
Amendment is drastically defeated if people cannot count on it to protect
them from unwanted governmental intrusions into their personal property.
Simply because a plain black case is labeled "GUN GUARD" or "Phoenix
Arms" instead of "BUSHMASTER" should not remove the owner's expectation that its contents will remain private. Nor should a plastic wrapped
item be safe from government intrusion in one jurisdiction, while remaining
246.
See United States v. Banks, 514 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 2008); Meada, 408 F.3d 14;
United States v. Williams, 41 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Corral, 970 F.2d
719 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Cardona-Rivera, 904 F.2d 1149 (7th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Blair, 665 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1981).
247.
980 So. 2d 521 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
248.
Id. at 522.
249.
Id.
250.
MICHAEL AVERY ET AL., POLICE MISCONDUCT: LAW AND LITIGATION 135 (3d ed.
2008) (quoting Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 1999)).
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open to intrusion in another. Additionally, a drug user or dealer should not
be more protected from warrantless searches simply because he or she
chooses to store their drugs in small foil packets instead of folded paper.
Just as the Supreme Court adopted one clear-cut rule to govern automobile searches 25' it needs to adopt an equally clear-cut rule to govern the
single-purpose container exception so that its application is uniform across
the circuits. The Court was almost there in Robbins, but fell short. 252 A majority of the Court, rather than a plurality, needs to decide that courts cannot
consider the context in which a container is found when applying the single-purpose container exception. To be complete, the Court would also
have to restrict courts from considering the particularized knowledge of the
searching officer. If the Supreme Court were to prohibit this evidence,
fewer containers would be subject to the exception, thus respecting the
Warrant Clause and promoting consistency in the constitutional treatment
of containers by limiting police discretion and requiring lower courts to
apply the exception identically. In this limited form, the single-purpose
container exception could persist without seriously eroding the Fourth
Amendment and still be a helpful tool for law enforcement officials looking
to conduct searches efficiently and lawfully, but the better option still,
would be to invalidate the exception altogether.
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